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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880650-CA 
v. 
RUEBEN ROSS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appelant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of forgery, a felony 
in the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 
(Supp. 1988), following a jury trial in Third District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable John A. Rokich, judge, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence 
of defendant's prior attempted forgery conviction under Utah R. 
Evid. 609 to impeach his credibility. 
2. Whether a statement of the prosecutor, in which she 
asked for a recess to allow the witness to compose herself and 
mentioned that the witness had had a death in the family, was 
improper and so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of forgery* 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (Supp. 1988): 
Forgery - "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, 
with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to 
be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another 
without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, 
or utters any writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the 
case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" 
includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second 
degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any 
other instrument or writing issued by the 
government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 
or more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a 
pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third 
degree if the writing is or purports to be a 
check with a face amount of less than $100, 
all other forgery is a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 609: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of 
the witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a 
conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless 
the proponent gives to the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such 
evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or 
certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule 
if (1) the conviction has been the subject of 
a pardon, annulment, certificate of 
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure 
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of 
the person convicted, and that person has not 
been convicted os a subsequent crime which 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has 
been the subject or a pardon, annulment, or 
other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of 
juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, 
however, in a criminal case allow evidence of 
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other 
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than the accused if conviction of the offense 
would be admissible to attack the credibility 
of an adult and the court is satisfied that 
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair 
determination of the issue of guilty or 
innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of 
an appeal therefrom does not render evidence 
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of 
the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rueben Ross, was convicted of forgery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1988), a felony of 
the second degree, following a jury trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. He 
was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about July 8, 1988, a checkbook was taken from 
the desk of James Quigley, located in his office at 1750 
University Club Building (T. 4-6). The checks were drawn on the 
trust account of James and Anne Quigley (T. 24, 91). 
On July 9, 1988, the defendant met Jeannie Hunter at a 
convenience store. Ms. Hunter aggreed to give defendant a ride 
to a liquor store in return for gas money (T. 14). After going 
to the liquor store (T. 18-19, 90), defendant did not have the 
money to pay Ms. Hunter for gas, and requested her assistance in 
helping him cash a check, which he claimed was from his 
grandmother (T. 19, 90). Ms. Hunter told defendant that she only 
had one form of I.D. and that it would be difficult to cash the 
two-party check. Defendant told Ms. Hunter that Check Mart would 
cash a check with no identification (T. 20). Defendant led Ms. 
Hunter to a house (T. 21, 91), where he procured a check, drawn 
on the account of James and Anne Quigley, made out to Ms. Hunter 
for two hundred dollars (T. 24, 91). 
Ms. Hunter and defendant drove to Check Mart. As they 
were entering the building, defendant suggested that Ms. Hunter 
tell the teller that the check was from Ms. Hunter's grandmother 
(T. 27). Ms. Hunter presented the check, and the teller had Ms. 
Hunter endorse and place a thumbprint on the back of the check 
(T. 76). When asked who the check was from, defendant responded 
"our grandmother" T. 78, 103). When it was pointed out, because 
of the obvious racial difference between Ms. Hunter and 
defendant, that this was biologically unlikely, Ms. Hunter told 
the teller that it was from her grandmother (T. 78). 
The teller suspected the check was a forgery and 
contacted the police (T. 78). When the police entered the 
building they saw defendant look over his shoulder at them, and 
try to hide something in the waistband of his pants (T. 110). 
Police frisked the defendant and found the checkbook stolen from 
the Quigley's in the waistband of his pants (T. 111). 
Defendant's testimony contradicted that of Ms. Hunter. 
He claims that he met Ms. Hunter at the convenience store and 
offered to pay her gas money if she would take him to pick up his 
paycheck (T. 163). According to defendant, Ms. Hunter asked him 
if he would help her cash a check (T. 169). They went to the 
home of defendant's mother to cash the check (T. 169). She could 
not cash the check (T. 170). Defendant then suggested Ms. Hunter 
could cash the check at Check Mart (T. 171). 
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Upon leaving his mother's house, defendant next claims 
that Ms. Hunter dropped a checkbook on the lawn that he picked up 
and put in the waistband of his pants (T. 171). 
Defendant went to Check Mart with Ms. Hunter, but 
denied making any statements to the teller (T. 175). Defendant's 
testimony also contradicted the testimony of the arresting 
officer; he denied hiding the checkbook in the waistband of his 
pants (T. 197). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled, on defendant's motion 
in limine, that evidence of a prior conviction for attempted 
forgery was admissible to impeach credibility. Forgery is a 
crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and is 
automatically admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid 609(a)(2). 
Crimes that fall within the ambit of 609(a)(2) are not subject to 
the general balancing provision of Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) or 
403. Crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are always 
admissible for impeachment purposes. 
Defendant has failed to preserve for appeal a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, as he failed to make a timely and 
specific objection at trial. The statement was not of such a 
character that it could be considered plain error. Therefore, 
this Court should refuse to consider the issue on appeal. 
Alternatively, the innocuous statement of the prosecutor was not 
probably used by the jurors in making their decision. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant 
was guilty of forgery. 
AWiUMENT 
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A. Evidenee of prior attemptc^d forgery 
conviction is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 
609(a)(2): 
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the admissibliity of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. 
The rule states: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Defendant avers that i t Is unclear whether the trial 
judge allowed *h» evidence under subsection I or ? of Rule 6r:<* 
( a ) Il I f"! in i n in mi in I I n in « e ; i ' i i III III H i i III n- » i leni'w I 
*"'. :ent i a r> * s s .- .-
prior attempted forgery conviction was allowed under subsection 
(2), as a crime invloving dishonesty or false statement. Trial 
counsel attempted to classify the forgery conviction as a theft 
or robbery offense, which would not fall within the ambit of 609 
(a)(2)* (Transcript of Hearing [hereinafter T.H.] 7, 8). The 
trial court correctly ruled that forgery does not fit into this 
classification. The trial judge recognized that forgery is a 
crime involving deception, and bears directly on the accused's 
propensity to testify truthfully (T.H. 9). 
While this Court has not directly ruled on whether 
forgery is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement it has 
noted that "Utah's Rule 609 is the federal rule verbatim and 
advised that federal case law should be consulted for advice in 
interpreting the rule." State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17 (Utah 
App. 1988), citing State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 
1986). 
In United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 
1976), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court ruling that 
two forgery convictions were not admissible for impeachment 
purposes. Judge Kennedy held that M[t]hese convictions should 
. . . have been admitted to impeach Porter. Since forgery is a 
crime involving 'dishonesty or false statement', see e.g. United 
States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 
402 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1609, 29 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), and since the 
convictions were less than ten years old, their admissiblity at 
the trial is governed by Rule 609(a)(2)." Dixon at 1083. 
Likewise, in United States v. Bay, 762 P.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 
1984) the court found 1 hat " f e] v idence of a conviition ot 
forgery, which is a crime involving dishonesty and false 
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See also United States v. Field, 62 5 I . Jd 8 62, 871 (9th - . 
1980) ("prim conviction for forgery ii crime Involving 
i i a ini l u J e i i t I a I t i 1 J i a I i i in i. i i m i | i i II \ m i n i i s i I II i | 
As this Court pointed out in Wight# "there is still 
much disagreement among cases nnrl commentators about whirlhi 
crimes are usabl" I | L J IH! > I j 1 i 1 j | ,"-ipMb*' " 'J* J 
Wight, at 1 While not many federal circuit court decisions have 
specif ra 1 1 y r u 1 n 1 mi I Ih i r i finest i on 11 rioemf sot t 1 od tha t forgery 
lb considered a c:i 11110 involving dishonesty ui talst s tateim Mil. 
Perhaps thn dearth ni decisions ran bo attributed to thn Irn I 
1 Ih i l I In i mi I I il in i II i 1 1 i • I in i i n II II 1 p r i c in fiiiF i n t e r p r e ! incj 
6 0 9 ( a ) ( 2 ) have t y p i c a l l y d e a l t wi lh i r imes which hit 1 nut l e a d i l y 
i l l i n t o t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n The cases ( i t e d by defendan1 in 
li mi II mi mi in II a mi 1 in II II in 1 h i n o ' ) t I n 1 I • 1 1 1 1 1 y II 1 1 ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 '. 
I n
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involving dishonesty or false statement, the couiI looked to the 
legislative record to determine coiigressioiial intent regarding 
}l Il 11 hi "1 1 
By the phrase Mdishonesty and false 
statement" the Conference means crimes such 
as perjury or subornation of perjury, false 
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or 
false pretense, or any other offense in the 
nature of crimen falsi, the commission of 
which involves some element of deceit, 
untruthful ness- nr f«iRj f{cat J on bearing c 1 1 
the accused's propensity to testify 
truthfully. H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 93-1597, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 7098,7103. 
Id. at 362. Crimen falsi is a creature of Roman law originated 
to curtail the practice of forging, altering or destroying wills. 
The term was later expanded to include every species of fraud and 
deceit. Jd. at 362 n.26. Crimen falsi at common law was "any 
crime which rendered the perpetrator incompetent to be a witness, 
such as forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury and other crimes 
affecting the administration of justice." Black's Law Dictionary 
335 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Aside from perjury, it is 
hard to think of a crime which more directly bears on the 
veracity of an individual to testify truthfully than does 
forgery. 
Defendant next argues that according to Wight, 
609(a)(1) must be applied if the trial court does not make an 
inquiry into the facts of the prior conviction. This is 
incorrect. As the State reads Wight, an inquiry into the facts 
is at the discretion of the court. In Wight no inquiry was made 
into the facts of a robbery conviction to determine if dishonesty 
or false statement was present. Since the court determined that 
robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement, the 
court applied 609(a)(1). The characteristics of some crimes are 
such that this type of inquiry becomes unnecessary. In those 
cases, "Congress has substituted its judgment that evidence of 
such crimes is always sufficiently related to credibility to 
justify its admission." Smith at 358-9. Any type of fraudulent 
activity would fall under this rubric, including forgery. 
D ( It mi li'tn 1 i i 
conduct, but attempt? to mako a distinction betweeen forgery and 
attempted fnrqory (AM nt H| Defnnrtant is reiteratinq an 
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argument based on hih iindmq limit the previous conviction was 
thn result L I ij LIUI, winch he. lelt wm> orobably a reduced charge 
( I 11 'i | in JiJ j i IUII i li I | , i ho Judge Lit yiven a copy ol f he 
police report involved in the prior conviction (1 H ) <j This 
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Should the Court decide to evaluate the prior conviction under 
subsection (1) of Rule 609# the Banner test becomes applicable. 
Pursuant to Banner the following five factors need to be 
considered in deciding whether evidence of prior convictions is 
more probative than prejudicial: [1] The nature of the crime, 
as bearing on the character for veracity of the witness; [2 1 the 
recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction; [3] the 
similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, insofar as a 
close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a 
bad person; [4] the importance of credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution tried without the decisive 
nontestimonial evidence; and [5] the importance of the accused's 
testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused's character for veracity. In the 
instant case, application of the five factors would still weigh 
in favor of admitting evidence of the prior conviction, 
Admittedly, the third factor would weigh against admission. 
However, this factor alone is insufficient to conclude that in 
admitting the evidence, the trial court so abused its discretion 
that "there is a 1 tkelihood that injust j ce resulted.* 
B. Evidence offered under Rule 609(a)(2) is 
not subject to the general balancing 
provision of Rule 403. 
All federal circuits that have ruled on this specific 
question have held that the courts have no discretion to exclude, 
as unduly prejudicial, evidence that a witness had been 
previously convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false 
statement. Given the plain language of rule 609(a)(2), and the 
clear record of legislative intent, this interpretation is 
correct. Defendant would disregard these prior decisions, even 
though this Court has found that "federal case law should be 
consulted for advice in interpreting the rule." Wight at 16, 
citing Banner at 1333-34. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 is a general rule "designed as a 
guide for the handling of situations for which no specific rules 
have been formulated." See United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 
349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory 
committee note). Rule 403 was not designed to override more 
specific rules, such as 609(a). Ici. See also United States v. 
Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1983), cert, denied 464 U.S 842 
(1983); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert, denied 449 U.S 985 (1980); United States v. Levya, 659 F.2d 
118 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied 454 U.S. 1156 (1982). -General 
language of a statutory provision, although broad enough to 
include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically 
dealt with in another part of the same enactment. Specific terms 
prevail over the general in the same or another statute which 
otherwise might be controlling." Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 
U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (citations ommitted). 
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Defendant pointR In ii 1 I itemonl hv Representativp Lott 
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revisions in both the House and the Senate. It is to one of 
these early drafts that Representative Lott's comments would seem 
to apply. Clearly, the final version of the rule does not allow 
evidence of all prior felony convictions. The legislative 
history also points to an early version of the rule which 
included a subsection (3), which would have explicitly granted 
trial judges discretion to exclude evidence of crimes involving 
dishonesty or false statement if they determined that their 
probative value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial 
effect. See Kiendra at 354, 355; Wong at 67. This test is 
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identical to Rule 403. If Congress had intended this test to 
apply to crimes involving dishonesty or false statement, this 
provision would have remained. The Kiendra court points out: 
Rule 609(a) received extensive scrutiny in 
both chambers of Congress and underwent many 
modifications before the final compromise was 
struck in Conference Committee. 
Significantly, none of the six different 
proposals that were suggested by different 
committees, subcommittees and full houses 
called for the restoration of paragraph 3 
from the Revised Draft. 
Id. at 355 (footnote omitted). 
Like every other court to consider this question, this 
Court should be "driven by the force of explicit statutory 
language and legislative history to hold that evidence offered 
under Rule 609(a)(2) is not subject to the general balancing 
provision of Rule 403." .Id. at 354. 
1. The Advisory Committee's note described proposed section 
609(a)(3) as Ha particularized application" of Rule 403. Kiendra 
at 355, n.3, citing 51 F.R.D. 315, 393 (1971). 
POIN I" II 
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she and defendant were arrested. "The following testimony Wa© 
el HI i ted i 
Q [By the prosecutor] And how did you feel 
about that when you were in there, "i < I'IHII they 
took your son? 
A [By Ms. Hunter] When they took my son and 
my son saw them put handcuffs on me and they 
took him to the Detention Center, I was 
extremely angry, I felt so stupid and so 
so stupid for trying to help him. I just 
did. I just can't believe that he would just 
let me take my son there, just let me take my 
son there like that. 
Rueben, why did you. do that? 
[Defense counsel] I ask that the witness 
be admonished to answer the questions and 
not — 
The Witneeni1 I iii n o r r y , 1* a p o l o g i z e , 
rA4
~ «I t akn n minu te t o calm dowuiii (Weep- % 
- l b -
[Prosecutor] I was going to say the 
State has no further questions at this time, 
your Honor. Miss Hunter has recently had a 
death in her family and I wonder if we could 
have a recess. 
The Court: Court will be in recess. 
Remember the admonishment, ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, don't talk to each 
other or anyone else about this case, don't 
form any opinions or do any investigating. I 
will have Mr. Tingey come and bring you back 
when it is time to return. 
(Recess taken.) 
(T. 33-34.) 
The innocuous comment of the prosecutor does not fall 
within the plain error exception of rule 103(d). For a finding 
of plain error two requirements must be met: 
(1) That the error be "plain", i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be 
able to say that it should have been obvious 
to a trial court that it was committing error 
and; 
(2) That the error affect the substantial 
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error 
be harmful. . . . 
State v. Eldredqe, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah Feb. 1, 1989) 
(citations ommittted) (footnote omitted). 
Defendant fails to meet either prong of the Eldredge 
requirement. First, it is not clear to the State at this point 
that the prosecutor's statement constituted error of any kind. 
The statement was made when the prosecutor was requesting a 
recess in order for the witness to compose herself. Defendant 
claims that the prosecutor made this statement in an attempt to 
garner sympathy for the witness. It appears that the prosecutor 
would have elicited more sympathy for the defendant if she had 
allowed the emotional outburst of the witness to go unexplained. 
In the context of the trial, the jury would have assumed the 
witness was crying solely because she had been used by the 
defendant. In any case, the error would clearly not have been 
obvious to a trial court. 
Evaluation of the second requirement becomes 
unnecessary, as the statement was not "plain" error. 
Nevertheless, the error did not have a substantial impact on the 
verdict. The prosecutor's statement that the witness had a death 
in the family added nothing to the credibility of the witness. 
If, as defendant claims, the essence of this case involved the 
question for the jury as to which witness was more believable, a 
statement which might elicit sympathy for a witness would add 
nothing to their credibility. Because the alleged error does not 
fall witin the ambit of rule 103(d) this court should refuse to 
consider the issue. 
Should the Court decide to reach the merits of this 
claim, State v. Valdez, 30 Utah2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973) 
established the rule governing reversals for improper statements 
of counsel: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and 
were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks• 
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While a death in the witness' family is not relevant to the 
issues, it is not something that is contemplated by the first 
prong (jurors would not be "justified" in considering fact) of 
the Valdez test. However, arguably, the jury would not be 
justified in considering a death in the witness' family, in 
determining their verdict. Nevertheless, the second prong of the 
test has not been met. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
jurors were probably not influenced by the remarks of the 
prosecutor. Defendant's contention seems to be that the 
statement was made in an attempt to inflame the jury. Given the 
innocuous nature of the statement this argument is untenable. 
Defendant goes on to claim that the statement had a greater 
impact "because it was presented to the jurors as if it were an 
accepted fact, without giving Mr. Ross the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness" (A.B. 22). The State is uncertain how this 
would give the statement greater impact, nor what cross-
examination would have revealed. Defendant also ignores the fact 
that defense counsel cross-examined the witness directly after 
the recess. This Court should find that under the circumstances 
of this case that the jurors were not influenced by the comments 
of the prosecutor. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
OF FORGERY. 
Defendant claims that the evidence produced at trial 
was insufficient to convict of forgery. The Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that 
when a defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain 
his conviction, and appellate court should limit the scope of its 
review. 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Petree, Utah, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. 
McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982). 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
MIt is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses...." State v. 
Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord 
State v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 
(1983). So long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can be made, our inquiry stops. . . . 
Id. at 345. This Court has also succinctly stated that unless 
there is a clear showing by the appellant of lack of evidence, 
the jury verdict will be upheld. State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 
410, 412 (Utah App. 1987); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda 
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 393-94 (Utah App. 1987). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1978), sets out the elements 
of forgery. This section provides in pertinent part: 
76-6-501. Forgery—-Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without 
his authority or utters and such altered 
writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
outhenticates, issues, transfers, 
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publishes, or utters any writing so that 
the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, 
transferrrence, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, 
whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent. 
• • . . 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second 
degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
. . . . 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or 
m o r e . . . . 
The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that with the intent to defraud Check 
Mart, defendant issued a check, purported to be signed by James 
Quigley, to Jeannie Hunter for $200.00. 
Defendant met Ms. Hunter at a convenience store on July 
9, 1988 (T. 14). He enlisted her help in cashing a check which 
he claimed was from his grandmother (T. 19). Defendant gave Ms. 
Hunter a check which had been stolen the night before. The check 
was made out Ms. Hunter for $200.00 and had two forged signatures 
on the front (T. 5, 6, 24). Defendant accompanied Ms. Hunter to 
Check Mart to cash the check. While entering the building, 
defendant encouraged Ms. Hunter to misrepresent that the checking 
account was in the name of her grandparents. When questioned by 
the teller, defendant claimed that it was from his grandmother. 
Defendant bases his claim on conflicting testimony. As 
stated above, where the testimony conflicts, "it is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. 
The evidence supports the jury's conclusion that defendant was 
guilty of forgery. The evidence was not so insubstantial or 
lacking that a reasonable person would not have reached a guilty 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Rueben Ross, was properly convicted of 
forgery, a second degree felony. For the foregoing reasons, and 
any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of 
Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ^ d a y of June, 1989. 
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